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Abstract 
 
Small and medium-sized firms typically obtain capital via bank financing. They 
often rely on a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length banking. This paper 
explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking systems. 
We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination and subsequent firm 
liquidation is contingent on the borrower’s quality and on the relationship bank’s 
information precision. Generally, heterogeneous multiple banking leads to fewer 
inefficient credit decisions than monopoly relationship lending or homogeneous 
multiple banking, provided that the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt is 
not too large. 
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In many, particularly European, countries the business sector is characterized by a large
number of small to medium-sized, mostly owner-run ﬁrms. Typically, these ﬁrms use
bank lending as the only source of obtaining capital for their business projects.1 Over
time, the business relations to a bank may develop into what is called a “housebank”
relationship. The advantages of such relationship lending are well-known. Based on
a sustained monitoring process, the relationship bank may eﬃciently renegotiate con-
tracts, as such facilitating intertemporal transfers. Apparently, the softening of the
budget constraint is initially advantageous for small and informationally opaque ﬁrms
that run a high risk of ﬁnancial distress. However, once a borrower is informationally
tied to a bank, this exclusive relationship gives rise to a certain degree of monopoly
power so that the relationship bank may extract quasi-rents from the borrower (Rajan,
1992; Detragiache et al., 2000).
Considering unlisted, small and medium-sized ﬁrms that are not as easily able to dis-
close reliable information about their business prospects as larger, listed ﬁrms, one might
conjecture that the advantages of a relationship lending system may outweigh the dis-
advantage represented by the hold-up problem. In reality, however, we observe that
particularly in the sector of small and medium-sized businesses heterogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing prevails: ﬁrms typically hold credit relations to many banking institu-
tions of which one may be special in the sense of a relationship lender (Ongena and
Smith, 2000; Machauer and Weber, 2001; Brunner and Krahnen, 2001).
This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of heterogeneous multiple banking
in a theoretical model. We can show that under certain conditions, heterogeneous mul-
tiple bank ﬁnancing reduces the incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination and hence
of ineﬃcient ﬁrm liquidation. The theoretical framework entails elements from the
class of global games.2 The concept of global games has ﬁrst been applied to credit
markets by Hubert and Sch¨ afer (2002) and Morris and Shin (2004). While Hubert and
Sch¨ afer (2002) compare the isolated eﬀects of monopoly lending by a relationship lender
to those of a multitude of small lending institutions, Morris and Shin (2004) examine
coordination failures among homogeneous multiple lenders that force solvent but illiq-
uid borrowers into a liquidity crisis. Both models, however, ignore that ﬁrms often
hold multiple credit relations to diﬀerent banking institutions that may be classiﬁed as
heterogeneous according to the degree of informativeness about the borrower and the
bargaining power that they dispose of. Elsas et al. (2004) were among the ﬁrst to con-
sider the coexistence of a relationship bank with a multitude of “arm’s-length” banks
in a theoretical framework. They derive the optimal debt structure in an asymmetric
banking system from the trade-oﬀ between the bargaining power of the relationship
bank and the threat of coordination failure from multiple banking. However, Elsas et
1Only recently did German Mittelstand ﬁrms, for instance, open up to other forms of lending via
the capital markets. However, as the Economist (November 2003) remarks: “Though starved of bank
loans, German companies are reluctant to tap alternative sources of capital”.
2In a global game each player noisily observes the game’s payoﬀ structure, which itself is determined
by a random draw from a given class of games (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993)2
al (2004) assume that all banks are fully informed about their borrowers. Our model in
contrast, even though closely related to the former work, puts the diﬀerent informational
positions of bank lenders in the main focus. We assume that very precise information
about a ﬁrm’s business prospects can be obtained only through long-lasting relations
and hence is available only for the relationship bank. The resulting lack of as precise
information for arm’s-length banks matches particularly well the ﬁnancing of non-listed,
small to medium-sized ﬁrms that are in the main focus of this paper. Whereas Elsas
et al. (2004) stress the coordinating role of a relationship bank based on her substan-
tial fraction of total ﬁrm debt, we additionally analyze the eﬀects of her informational
advantage.
Generally, our model also lends from work on debt structures and the eﬀects of multiple
lenders, for instance by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
or Carletti (2004). The latter, in particular, studies the beneﬁts and drawbacks of
endogenous monitoring activities in multiple relationship banking. Similarly, our model
entails the basic trade-oﬀ between hold-up problem and soft-budget constraint arising
from informed lending via a relationship bank. However, this trade-oﬀ is embedded
in a heterogeneous multiple banking system, with both relationship and arm’s-length
lending, rather than a homogeneous multiple ﬁnancing regime as in Carletti (2004).
This adds a third dimension to the eﬀects of relationship lending: apart from holding-
up the ﬁrm on the one hand and smoothing intertemporal transfers on the other, the
relationship bank may also coordinate arm’s-length banks behavior and hence inﬂuence
the eﬃciency of credit decisions.
In contrast to the aforementioned work, we do not aim at establishing the optimal debt
structure. Rather, we analyze the eﬀect of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing on the
incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination, and hence on ineﬃcient project liquidation,
as compared to single relationship banking on the one hand and homogeneous multiple
banking on the other. As such, we complement the earlier work by Hubert and Sch¨ afer
(2002) by a richer structure of lender types. Additionally, we examine the eﬀects that
diﬀerent degrees of information precision among relationship and arm’s-length banks
have on the eﬃciency of credit decisions. In contrast to Elsas et al. (2004) we can
show that the outcome is not only inﬂuenced by the relationship bank’s “size”, i.e. her
fraction of total ﬁrm debt, but also by her informational advantage over arm’s-length
banks.
Our results are multi-faceted and diﬀerentiate between a system where the relationship
bank disposes of very but not inﬁnitely precise information and the limit where she pos-
sesses completely precise information about her borrowers. In the former case, we ﬁnd
that for ﬁrms running projects with low expected cash-ﬂows, i.e. for ﬁrms perceived to
be illiquid but solvent, the incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination and hence of ﬁrm
liquidation decreases in the relationship bank’s information precision, whenever a system
of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing has been employed. Based on the perceived
ﬁrm (respectively project) quality, the relationship bank lowers the credit repayment
in a renegotiation process. She thereby inﬂuences the credit decisions of arm’s-length
banks and increases credit access for the ﬁrm. Hence, the relationship bank coordinates
arm’s-length banks’ credit decisions towards the eﬃcient equilibrium. The stabilization3
of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms notwithstanding, a drawback of the heterogeneous mul-
tiple banking regime is that ﬁrms running projects with high expected cash-ﬂows face
a higher likelihood of ineﬃcient credit termination and project liquidation the more
precise their relationship bank’s information becomes. Here, the relationship bank’s
actions coordinate the small banks towards the ineﬃcient equilibrium. Similarly to our
results, Elsas et al. (2004) ﬁnd that if banks posses fully precise information, ﬁrms with
projects yielding low expected cash-ﬂows prefer ﬁnancing within a heterogeneous mul-
tiple banking system, while projects with high expected cash-ﬂows tend to be ﬁnanced
without a relationship bank.
Comparing heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing to monopolistic relationship banking,
we ﬁnd that in the case of ﬁnitely precise information, ineﬃcient project liquidation is
always less likely under the ﬁrst regime. Obviously, the interplay of coordination-, hold-
up and intertemporal-smoothing eﬀect eases the ﬁrm’s credit constraints as compared
to single relationship lending, which lacks the coordination mechanism, so that ineﬃ-
cient credit decisions are less probable in a heterogeneous system. Yet, compared to
homogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing, a heterogeneous regime should only be preferred
if the ﬁrm’s cost of capital caused by the relationship bank are relatively small, i.e. if her
fraction of total ﬁrm debt and the charged repayment rate are suﬃciently low. Hence,
contingent on the bargaining power of the relationship bank, the hold-up problem may
become severe enough relative to the coordination- and intertemporal-smoothing eﬀect
to render a homogeneous system more beneﬁcial than a heterogeneous banking regime.
Additionally, we consider the limiting case where the relationship bank disposes of com-
pletely precise private information about her borrowers. Here, our model shows that she
always charges the maximum feasible repayment, irrespective of the quality of projects
to be ﬁnanced, so that the intertemporal-smoothing eﬀect vanishes. Yet, coexistence
of relationship and arm’s-length banking still reduces the likelihood of ineﬃcient credit
termination compared to monopoly relationship banking, since the coordination-eﬀect
beneﬁcially inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s credit constraints. When compared to a homogeneous
multiple banking context, however, a heterogeneous system again fares better only if
the relationship bank’s fraction of debt is relatively small.
Our results match a number of stylized facts established from empirical studies on re-
lationship lending in a heterogeneous banking system. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) ﬁnd
that housebanks develop a truly distinct lending behavior despite competition from
other banking institutions. Based on data from the German credit market, they show
that relationship banks increase ﬁnancing to borrowers of deteriorating, but still sus-
tainable, quality. Similarly, Foglia et al. (1998), based on Italian data, conclude that the
existence of relationship lending from one speciﬁc banking institution increases ﬁrms’
general access to credit. Obviously, the relationship bank plays a coordinating role on
the credit market for all other ﬁnanciers, that, being deprived of as precise information,
act as arm’s-length lenders. Even some of our more detailed results are matched by
empirical ﬁndings. In particular, D’Auria et al. (1999) concur that with regard to the
pricing of loans, a privileged relationship to one particular lender may be preferable,
i.e. leading to lower cost of capital, as long as the relationship bank’s share of total
borrowing does not get so large as to represent a virtual monopoly.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general
model of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing in which a ﬁrm obtains credit from
a relationship bank and a multitude of arm’s-length banks. Section 3 examines the
characteristics of this ﬁnancing system provided that the relationship bank disposes
of ﬁnitely precise private information. The results are compared to a market where
the relationship bank acts as a monopolist and to a homogeneous multiple banking
regime. Section 4 studies the limiting case where the relationship bank obtains private
information of inﬁnitely high precision. Again, a comparative statics analysis is followed
by a comparison of diﬀerent banking regimes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model considers a simple economy with three types of agents: a ﬁrm, a relationship
bank and a continuum of arm’s-length banks.3 Both types of lenders are approached by
the ﬁrm in order to obtain ﬁnancing for a risky business project. The project matures
within three time periods. At an intermediate stage, lenders may withdraw their money
prematurely so that the project is threatened by early liquidation.
The bank ﬁnancing system is heterogeneous in two respects. First, it is assumed that
the housebank has been having long-term relations with the ﬁrm and therefore disposes
of more precise information about the ﬁrm than arm’s-length banks. Second, the re-
lationship bank is supposed to grant a loan of non-negligible size. In particular, her
loan provides a fraction ¸ of total ﬁrm debt. Arm’s-length banks, in contrast, grant
loans that are negligibly small individually but amount to a combined proportion of
1 ¡ ¸ of the full credit. Arm’s-length banks are therefore distinguished from the rela-
tionship bank by a smaller ﬁnancial “size” and a lower precision of information about
the borrower’s quality.
The model has the following time structure:
² In t = 0, the ﬁrm approaches the banks in order to raise capital for a risky business
project. It oﬀers a repayment of r per unit of capital in t = 3. Provided that
ﬁnancing decisions have been successful, the ﬁrm invests in the project.
² In t = 1, project quality µ is realized from a normal distribution N(¹µ;¾µ). µ is
unobservable to the banks. Instead, they receive noisy private information about
it: the relationship bank observes a private signal xR = µ + " with " » N(0; 1
®),
while the small banks observe individual private signals xALi = µ + "i with "i »
N(0; 1
¯). It is assumed that " and "i are independent of each other and of µ. Based
on her private information, the relationship bank decides whether to renegotiate
the repayment and extend credit or to foreclose the loan. The arm’s-length banks
3Empirical studies found that for medium-sized European ﬁrms, the number of banking relationships
varies between 1 and 70 (Ongena and Smith, 2000). In the model, the assumption of a continuum of
arm’s length lenders is made for simplicity and does not qualitatively inﬂuence the results.5
observe her actions and decide whether to extend or withdraw their loans as well.4
Early foreclosures deliver a liquidation value of K per unit of capital for both types
of lenders.
² In t = 2, project quality µ becomes uncovered. The ﬁrm makes her choice whether
to invest additional eﬀort V into the project and reﬁnance the foreclosed fraction of
loans or to terminate the project altogether. In the latter case, the ﬁnal liquidation
value of the project is normalized to zero.
² In t = 3, if the project has not been terminated prematurely, the project’s cash-
ﬂow is realized and equals µ. Credit is repaid with the ﬁrm holding the residual
claim.
With regard to banks’ information it is assumed that ® > ¯, so that the relationship
bank disposes of at least as precise posterior information about µ as arm’s-length banks.
Furthermore, all bargaining power is supposed to rest with the relationship bank. The
repayment rate renegotiated by the relationship bank is referred to as rR. Since small to
medium-sized ﬁrms, that are in the main focus of this paper, typically do not dispose of
large collateral, it is assumed that K < r;rR. Whereas the early liquidation value K is
the same for all banks, we assume that the relationship bank causes higher reﬁnancing
costs per unit of capital, WR, than the small banks, WAL, i.e. WR ¸ WAL ¸ r, which
gives rise to a hold-up problem. Note that WR is the maximum feasible amount of
repayment that the relationship bank can demand of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, in order
to simplify the analysis, eﬀort V is normalized to zero. Finally, we assume ¾µ ! 1, i.e.
we examine the limiting case where the variance of µ becomes very large, so that banks
dispose of hardly any prior information about the project quality. Again, we believe this
assumption to be justiﬁed for small and medium-sized ﬁrms that are informationally
opaque. Furthermore, since the focus of our study is on the banks’ conditional beliefs
after observing their noisy private signals, imposing an improper prior distribution on
µ considerably simpliﬁes the analysis without altering the core results.
Note that we do not analyze the initial ﬁnancing decisions by the banks. In essence,
we assume that the ﬁrm already holds credit relations to the banks, which have to be
either conﬁrmed by extending the loans in the intermediate period or terminated by
withdrawing the money prematurely. Our model is therefore focussed solely on the
credit continuation decision.
Solving the sequential model backwards, the ﬁrm has to decide whether to reﬁnance
the withdrawn fraction of loans or to terminate the project altogether. If the project is
terminated, the ﬁrm receives no payoﬀ at all. If the withdrawn money is reﬁnanced, the
ﬁrm receives payoﬀ ¼F(reﬁnance) = µ ¡ ¸rR ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ l)r ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)lWAL whenever
the relationship bank decides to renegotiate the repayment and extends credit. Here,
4The relationship bank may therefore use her actions as a signal to the arm’s-length banks. A similar
approach has been chosen by Pagratis (2004) in an analysis of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms and the role
that banks play in the restructuring of debtors’ contractual obligations. In contrast to Pagratis, we
study both ﬁrms perceived to be in distress, i.e. running projects with low expected cash-ﬂows, and
those with projects yielding high expected cash-ﬂows.6
l denotes the proportion of small banks that foreclose their loans. If, instead, the
relationship bank chooses to withdraw her loan prematurely, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from
reﬁnancing is given by ¼F(reﬁnance) = µ ¡ ¸WR ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ l)r ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)lWAL.
Assuming that it is optimal for the ﬁrm to employ a trigger strategy, we ﬁnd the
following. If the relationship bank extends her part of the loan, the ﬁrm will terminate
the project rather than reﬁnance the withdrawn money whenever the realized project
value µ is lower than
µ¤
1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)l:
If, instead, the housebank chooses to foreclose the loan, the ﬁrm will terminate the
project for values of µ lower than
µ¤
2 = ¸WR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)l:
In order to interpret the equilibrium values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2, it is useful to introduce two
boundary values for µ. Let µ1 be the threshold value of the project cash-ﬂow that renders
the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between terminating the project and reﬁnancing the withdrawn part
of the loan, if all ﬁnanciers (including the relationship bank) extend their loan,
µ1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)r: (1)
Similarly, let µ2 be the threshold value that makes the ﬁrm indiﬀerent between termi-
nating and reﬁnancing if all ﬁnanciers withdraw their loan,
µ2 = ¸WR + (1 ¡ ¸)WAL: (2)
Hence, for l ! 0, µ¤
1 converges to µ1 from above, for l ! 1, µ¤
2 converges to µ2 from
below.
In the following, we will assume that all players in this game optimally employ trigger
strategies.5 In particular, suppose that small banks switch their decision from foreclos-
ing to extending the loan exactly after observing a private signal of x¤
AL. The proportion
l of arm’s-length banks withdrawing their money early is then given by those who re-
ceive private information lower than x¤
AL, i.e. l = prob(xAL · x¤
ALjµ):6 The equilibrium
values for the project cash-ﬂow, µ¤
1 and µ¤
2, are then resolved as
µ¤
1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
1)) (3)
and
µ¤
2 = ¸WR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
2)) ; (4)
where Φ(¢) denotes the cumulative normal distribution.7
Fig. 1 shows the structure of project cash-ﬂows and the corresponding equilibrium
outcomes. Whenever the realized cash-ﬂow of the ﬁrm’s project is below µ1, the
5For a proof of trigger strategies being optimal in global games, see Morris and Shin (2004).
6Note that, due to the assumed independence of signal noise, the proportion of banks receiving
private information lower than x
¤
AL is equal to the probability with which an individual bank observes
a signal lower than x
¤
AL.
7Likewise, '(¢) denotes the normal density.7
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Figure 1: Range of project values
project will be terminated with certainty, even if all small banks and the relationship
bank (RB) extend their loans. Terminating the project is the eﬃcient choice for this
range of very low project qualities. If µ1 < µ < µ¤
1, the proportion of arm’s-length banks
withdrawing their loans is still so high that the ﬁrm will decide not to continue the
project even if the relationship bank renegotiates the repayment and rolls over the loan.
However, terminating the project is not eﬃcient any more, since it is not warranted
by the project quality: the ﬁrm would have proceeded with the project had only the
proportion of withdrawn credit been smaller. For µ¤
1 < µ < µ¤
2, the outcome depends
entirely on the behavior of the relationship bank. If she decides to renegotiate and
extend credit, the ﬁrm will choose to reﬁnance the money withdrawn from the small
banks. If, however, the relationship bank forecloses the loan, the ﬁrm will choose to
terminate the project. Whenever the project quality is higher than µ¤
2 but lower than µ2,
the ﬁrm will decide to proceed with the project even if the relationship bank chooses to
foreclose the loan. For µ > µ2, the project cash-ﬂow is so high that the project succeeds
with certainty, no matter what the small banks and the relationship bank decide to do.8
For x¤
AL to be a trigger for the arm’s-length banks’ decision of whether to withdraw
or extend credit, they have to be indiﬀerent between the two actions when observing a
private signal of xALi = x¤
AL:
¼AL(foreclosejxALi = x¤
AL) = ¼AL(extendjxALi = x¤
AL)
K = r ¢ prob(µ ¸ µ¤
2jxALi = x¤
AL)
+ r ¢ prob(µ¤
1 · µ · µ¤
2jxALi = x¤
AL;xR ¸ x¤
R) :
Whenever a project value higher than µ¤
2 is realized, the ﬁrm will continue the project
irrespective of the relationship bank’s decision. For project values between µ¤
1 and µ¤
2,
however, continuation of the project critically depends on the relationship bank’s action.
Even though arm’s-length banks can observe her decision, they still have to calculate
8The interval [µ1;µ2] is the typical range where multiple equilibria occur in a homogeneous banking
regime whenever the project value µ is common knowledge. Hence, in this interval both credit with-
drawal and credit extension are self-sustaining equilibria that lead to (ineﬃcient) project termination
or (eﬃcient) project continuation, respectively.8
the probability that the project value lies in the interval [µ¤
1;µ¤
2], conditional on their
observation and private information xAL.
For the relationship bank a trigger value of x¤
R is determined by a similar condition of
indiﬀerence:
¼R(foreclosejxR = x¤
R) = ¼R(renegotiate and extendjxR = x¤
R)
K = rR ¢ prob(µ ¸ µ¤
1jxR = x¤
R); (5)
where
rR = arg max
r·WR
r ¢ prob(µ ¸ µ¤
1jxR) ;
which leads to9
rR =
1 ¡ Φ(
p
®(µ¤
1 ¡ xR))
p
®
@µ¤
1
@rR'(
p
®(µ¤
1 ¡ xR))
for all xR ¸ x¤
R: (6)
The optimal repayment for the relationship bank is then the rR that balances two
diﬀerent eﬀects on her expected payoﬀ. First, there is a positive eﬀect of an increase
in rR due to higher repayment per unit of capital whenever credit is repaid. Second,
however, a higher repayment to the relationship bank aﬀects the threshold value µ¤
1
that has to be exceeded by cash-ﬂow µ for the project to be continued and hence for
credit to be repaid. Interestingly, the eﬀect of rR on µ¤
1 may be both positive and
negative. On the one hand, a higher repayment to the relationship bank leads to higher
cost of capital to the ﬁrm. This, in turn, requires a higher project cash-ﬂow µ for the
project to be continued. Hence, it reduces the incidence of credit repayment via an
increase in µ¤
1, which may be denoted as the “cost”-eﬀect of rR on µ¤
1. On the other
hand, small banks, knowing about the relationship bank’s informational advantage, may
interpret an increase in rR as a sign that the relationship bank observed more optimistic
information about the project value. This, in turn, makes it more reasonable for small
banks to extend their loans, so that µ¤
1 decreases. This second impact may be referred
to as the “information”-eﬀect of rR on µ¤
1. Both eﬀects are strongly inﬂuenced by the
relationship bank’s fraction of total ﬁrm debt, ¸, since it determines both the fraction
of capital that succumbs to the renegotiation process but also the fraction 1¡¸ of debt
that remains to be coordinated on either extending or withdrawing.
The relationship bank’s indiﬀerence condition (5) leads to the following equation deﬁn-
ing her trigger signal x¤
R:
x¤
R = µ¤
1 +
1
p
®
Φ¡1
µ
K
rR
¶
: (7)
Whenever the relationship bank observes private information lower than x¤
R she will
foreclose the loan. For private information higher than x¤
R, however, she will renegotiate
the repayment rate and roll over the loan.
9See also appendix A.9
Based on the strategy of the ﬁrm and the observed behaviour of the relationship bank,
arm’s-length banks are indiﬀerent between foreclosing and extending their loans, when-
ever they observe a private signal of10
x¤
AL = x¤
R +
s
® + ¯
®¯
Φ¡1
·r
R µ¤
2
µ¤
1 Φ(
p
®(µ ¡ x¤
R))'(
p
¯(µ ¡ x¤
AL))dµ
K ¡ Φ(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
2))
¸
: (8)
For lower signals they will withdraw, for higher signals they will extend credit. The
equilibrium in trigger strategies is hence described by equations (3), (4), (7) and (8).
Note that both the hold-up and intertemporal-smoothing eﬀect of the relationship
bank’s actions are manifested in rR. Whenever the relationship bank requests a higher
repayment rate, i.e. rR > r, this may be attributed to her ability to hold-up the ﬁrm,
whereas a decrease in repayment, i.e. rR < r, clearly eases the ﬁrm’s budget constraints.
The relationship bank’s coordination-eﬀect, in contrast, shows up in the development
of threshold value µ¤
1 (and also of µ¤
2) and may be decomposed into the cost-eﬀect and
the information-eﬀect as described above.
The following section analyzes the equilibrium in more detail, with emphasis on the
relationship bank’s action serving as a (coordinating) signal. We furthermore compare
the model of heterogeneous multiple credit relations to a setting with a relationship bank
acting as monopolist and also to a completely homogeneous credit market consisting
solely of arm’s-length banks.
3 Analysis of Financial Systems - Finitely Precise Infor-
mation
3.1 Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing
One of the key features of relationship lending is that the housebank may renegotiate
the rate that has to be repaid on her fraction of debt.11 Since the bargaining result
is observable, the relationship bank may try to signal her information to the rest of
the market. Before we investigate the impact of the bargaining process on the equilib-
rium, we will analyze in which way the relationship bank’s information inﬂuences the
renegotiated repayment rate rR. Based on these results, we will then examine how her
decision to foreclose or to renegotiate the repayment rate and extend the loan impacts
the threshold values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 of the project. Since for all µ ¸ µ1 credit termination is
ineﬃcient, we will interpret a decrease in µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 as a reduction in the probability of
ineﬃcient credit termination, respectively of project liquidation, as it reduces the state
space of ineﬃcient credit decisions.
10For the derivation of the equilibrium equation for arm’s-length banks, see appendix B.
11Note that due to the assumption that all the bargaining power rests with the relationship bank, the
renegotiated repayment, in a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, extracts all the ex-ante expected surplus from the
ﬁrm.10
For the eﬀect of the relationship bank’s private information xR on the repayment rate
rR, we ﬁnd the following:
Lemma 1 For @µ¤
1=@rR suﬃciently high (low), the relationship bank will request a
higher (lower) repayment rate with improving information, i.e. higher signal xR.
Proof:
The eﬀect of the relationship bank’s private information on the renegotiated repayment
rate is given by:
@rR
@xR
=
p
®
@µ¤
1
@rR['(¢) + 1 ¡ Φ(¢)] ¡ [1 ¡ Φ(¢)]
@2µ¤
1
@rR@xR
p
®'(¢)[
@µ¤
1
@rR]2
;
where (¢) = (
p
®(µ¤
1 ¡ xR)). The sign of this derivative depends on the ratio of the
second-order derivative of µ¤
1 to its ﬁrst-order derivatives. In particular, @rR
@xR is positive
if
@2µ¤
1
@xR@rR <
1¡Φ(¢)+'(¢)
1¡Φ(¢)
p
®
@µ¤
1
@rR(1 ¡
@µ¤
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@xR), which is the case for suﬃciently high @µ¤
1=@rR.
In contrast, rR decreases in xR if
@2µ¤
1
@xR@rR >
1¡Φ(¢)+'(¢)
1¡Φ(¢)
p
®
@µ¤
1
@rR(1¡
@µ¤
1
@xR), which holds for
suﬃciently low @µ¤
1=@rR. Q.E.D.
A higher signal xR increases the relationship bank’s posterior expectation with respect
to project cash-ﬂow. Hence, she may try to charge a higher repayment in order to
extract the higher expected net proﬁt from the ﬁrm. However, she knows that thresh-
old µ¤
1 is inﬂuenced by her choice of rR. As a consequence, @rR=@xR is positive only
if the repayment rate rR has a strong positive impact on the threshold value µ¤
1. In
this case, the cost-eﬀect of the relationship bank’s action dominates, so that with im-
proving information an increase in rR is necessary to oﬀset the (increasing) eﬀect on
µ¤
1 and the resulting negative impact on her expected proﬁt. If instead threshold µ¤
1
decreases in rR, a lower private signal induces the relationship bank to request a higher
repayment rate. In this case, the information-eﬀect of her action is suﬃciently strong
to reduce the proportion of credit withdrawn by arm’s-length banks along with rR, so
that with deteriorating expectations about the project’s cash-ﬂow, a higher repayment
rate is necessary to compensate the relationship bank for the low probability of credit
repayment.
Likewise, the impact of the relationship bank’s information precision ® on the renego-
tiated repayment rate rR depends on the repayment rate’s eﬀect on threshold µ¤
1:
Lemma 2 For @µ¤
1=@rR > 0, more precise private information induces the relationship
bank to bargain for a lower (higher) repayment rate whenever her private information
is suﬃciently low (high). For @µ¤
1=@rR < 0, the opposite holds.
Proof:11
The partial derivative
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and positive otherwise. The opposite holds if
@µ¤
1
@rR < 0. Q.E.D.
Let us illustrate this result for the case where the relationship bank’s cost-eﬀect out-
weighs the information-eﬀect, so that µ¤
1 increases in rR. If the relationship bank receives
optimistic information about the ﬁrm’s project (i.e. a high signal xR), she will charge
a higher repayment rate the more precise her private information is. Precise optimistic
posterior information will ascertain the relationship bank that the project will be contin-
ued, so that demanding a high repayment maximizes her proﬁt even though µ¤
1 increases
in rR. If, in contrast, the relationship bank is pessimistic about the project’s prospects
due to low posterior information xR, she will grant a lower repayment rate the more
precise her information is. In that case, higher information precision convinces her that
the ﬁrm may not be able to continue the project, since its cash-ﬂow is very likely to
be too low. Reducing the repayment rate eases the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints and in-
creases the probability of credit repayment, thereby maximizing the relationship bank’s
payoﬀ despite the lowering of the repayment rate rR.
Should, however, the information-eﬀect of the relationship bank’s action dominate, so
that µ¤
1 decreases in rR, she will charge a lower repayment rate with more precise opti-
mistic information and a higher repayment rate with more precise pessimistic informa-
tion. Since small banks will interpret an increase in rR as more optimistic information
observed by the relationship bank, they will extend their loans for a larger interval
of signals and hence reduce the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints exactly when it is needed
most: in the case of (perceived) ﬁnancial distress. This, in turn, allows the relationship
bank to increase the repayment rate (in order to maximize her payoﬀ) even though
she has precise pessimistic information about the project value. In contrast, since the
information-eﬀect leads a lower repayment rate rR to increase µ¤
1 and hence raises the
incidence of project failure, the relationship bank can lower rR only if she is sure that the
project’s payoﬀ will be suﬃciently high, i.e. if she has precise and optimistic information
about µ.
Apart from the relationship bank’s information parameters xR and ®, also her fraction
of total ﬁrm debt, ¸, has an impact on the bargained repayment rate rR.12
Lemma 3 Whenever @µ¤
1=@rR is suﬃciently high (low), the bargained repayment rate
rR increases (decreases) along with ¸.
Proof:
The impact of ¸ on the bargained repayment rate is given by
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This partial derivative is positive as long as
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1
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@rR, which tends
to be the case if
@µ¤
1
@rR is suﬃciently high. Otherwise, rR will decrease in the housebank’s
proportion of credit, ¸. Q.E.D.
If the cost-eﬀect of the relationship bank’s repayment renegotiation is suﬃciently strong,
a higher value of ¸ must induce an increase in the repayment rate to make up for the
reduction in expected payoﬀ following from a low probability of credit repayment and
vice versa.
In the following, we will analyze the inﬂuence of the renegotiated repayment rate rR on
the equilibrium values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 that the cash-ﬂow has to exceed for the project to be
continued.
Lemma 4 Equilibrium values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 increase (decrease) along with rR if x¤
AL rises
(falls) in rR.
Proof:
@µ¤
1
@rR
=
¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)
p
¯'(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
1))
1 + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)
p
¯'(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
1))
¢
@x¤
AL
@rR
@µ¤
2
@rR
=
(1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)
p
¯'(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
2))
1 + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)
p
¯'(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
2))
¢
@x¤
AL
@rR
:
Q.E.D.
The inﬂuence of rR on the strategy of arm’s-length banks plays a pivotal role for the
model. In particular, it determines whether the information-eﬀect or the cost-eﬀect
of the renegotiation process dominates, so that the threshold values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 either
decrease or increase in rR. Even though we can show that small banks’ trigger signal
x¤
AL decreases in rR whenever r takes on extreme values and K lies in an intermediate
region,12 the sign of this derivative is not fully determined (see appendix C). However,
a combination of the results derived so far allows interesting interpretations with regard
to the eﬃciency of credit decisions and is given in proposition 1. It sums up the eﬀects
of the relationship bank’s private information precision on credit extension and project
continuation decisions. The results diﬀerentiate between a ﬁrm (respectively its project)
12This combination of parameter values describes a situation where premature withdrawal of credit
is not very attractive to banks while extending the credit is either very desirable (high value of r) or
not desirable at all (low value of r).13
perceived as sound by the relationship bank, which is the case if the housebank observes
high posterior information xR, and a ﬁrm perceived as distressed, i.e. for low posterior
information xR.
Proposition 1 Increasingly (decreasingly) precise private information held by the re-
lationship bank reduces (raises) the incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination decisions
for ﬁrms perceived as distressed. The opposite holds for ﬁrms perceived as sound.
Table 1 delineates the mechanisms for the case of an increase in the relationship bank’s
information precision.
Table 1: Eﬀects of an increase in ®
ﬁrm perceived as sound ﬁrm perceived as distressed
@x¤
AL
@rR > 0 rR " ) x¤
AL ", µ¤
1 ", µ¤
2 " rR # ) x¤
AL #, µ¤
1 #, µ¤
2 #
@x¤
AL
@rR < 0 rR # ) x¤
AL ", µ¤
1 ", µ¤
2 " rR " ) x¤
AL #, µ¤
1 #, µ¤
2 #
No matter whether cost-eﬀect (@x¤
AL=@rR > 0) or information-eﬀect (@x¤
AL=@rR < 0)
dominate, whenever the relationship bank obtains more precise information, the risk
of ineﬃcient credit termination is reduced for projects perceived as distressed by the
relationship bank, but is increased for projects with high expected cash-ﬂows. The
opposite holds for a decreasing precision of information held by the relationship bank.
For ﬁrms perceived to be sound, the coordination-eﬀect of the relationship bank’s deci-
sions always leads to an increase of ineﬃcient credit decisions the higher the relationship
bank’s information precision becomes. Whenever the cost-eﬀect of the renegotiation
process dominates, so that x¤
AL rises in rR, the relationship bank has to ask for higher
repayment rR with increasing precision of her (optimistic) information in order to max-
imize her proﬁt (lemma 2). The higher value of rR and the resulting hold-up costs make
small banks more reluctant to extend credit, so that x¤
AL increases. Hence, the project
cash-ﬂow has to exceed higher threshold values in order to let the project be contin-
ued by the ﬁrm. As a consequence, the prior probability of project liquidation increases
(lemma 4). If, in contrast, the information-eﬀect of the renegotiation process dominates,
more precise information leads the relationship bank to ask for a lower repayment rate.
Small banks will interpret this intertemporal smoothing as a sign of a lower project
quality and again will foreclose their loans for a larger range of signals. Hence, µ¤
1 and
µ¤
2 are increased and the incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination is raised.
For ﬁrms with low expected project cash-ﬂows, the coordination-eﬀect, in combination
with either hold-up or intertemporal smoothing, always decreases the likelihood of in-
eﬃcient credit decisions. If the cost-eﬀect of rR dominates, increasing precision of her
(pessimistic) information induces the relationship bank to lower the repayment rate in
order to soften the ﬁrm’s budget constraints. Due to the dominance of the cost-eﬀect,
small banks acknowledge the reduced pressure on the ﬁrm’s repayment amount and
consequently extend their loans even for lower values of their private signals. Thus, the
probability of ineﬃcient credit termination is reduced. Whenever the information-eﬀect14
of the renegotiation process dominates, however, after observing more precise informa-
tion the relationship bank will demand a higher repayment rate in order to make up for
the lower perceived probability of credit repayment. This increase in the ﬁrm’s hold-up
costs will, however, be interpreted by small banks as a sign of an improved ﬁrm quality,
so that they extend their loans even for lower private information, i.e. µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 are
decreased.
As can be seen, the various cells in Table 1 present diﬀerent combinations of cost-
eﬀect (in the upper row) and information-eﬀect (lower row) with either hold-up or
intertemporal-smoothing mechanism. If we assume that the ﬁrm is best-oﬀ with a
low repayment and low values of µ¤
1 and µ¤
2, while the relationship bank aims at low
values of µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 as well but prefers a high repayment rate rR, we can see that
with increasing information precision perceived by the relationship bank the optimal
position for the ﬁrm is the upper right cell, where the cost-eﬀect is combined with
intertemporal-smoothing, whereas the relationship bank prefers the lower right cell,
which combines the information-eﬀect with a hold-up. Firms running projects with
high expected cash-ﬂows, in contrast, beneﬁt from a decrease in the relationship bank’s
information precision.
3.2 Comparing Financial Systems
In the following, we will ﬁrst compare the system of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁ-
nancing of section 3.1 to single relationship banking, i.e. a monopoly of the relationship
bank (¸ = 1). Secondly, we will analyze the case where only arm’s-length debt is avail-
able (¸ = 0), so that the ﬁrm holds multiple credit relations with homogeneous small
banks.
3.2.1 Single Relationship Lending
Let us assume that in the ﬁrst stage of the game (t = 0) the only source of ﬁnancing
is the relationship bank. In the later stages, further ﬁnanciers are supposed to exist, so
that reﬁnancing in t = 2 is still a viable option to the ﬁrm.
From the ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence condition it follows that the critical value of the project
up to which the ﬁrm always chooses to terminate the project rather than reﬁnance is
ˆ µ = WR. By renegotiating the repayment rate, the relationship bank tries to maximize
her proﬁt from extending the loan. Feasibility requires ˆ rR · WR, so that
ˆ rR = arg max
r·WR
r ¢ prob(µ · ˆ µjxR = ˆ xR) = WR
Hence, in a monopoly situation, the relationship bank always demands the maximum
repayment, so that the intertemporal-smoothing eﬀect vanishes and the ﬁrm succumbs
to maximal hold-up. The relationship bank is then indiﬀerent between withdrawing15
and extending the loan if:
¼R(withdraw) = ¼R(extend)
K = WR ¢ prob(µ ¸ ˆ µjxR = ˆ xR)
ˆ xR = WR +
1
p
®
Φ¡1(
K
WR
) : (9)
Based on the equilibrium values ˆ rR, ˆ µ and ˆ xR, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 5 The incidence of ineﬃcient project termination in a monopoly relationship
lending regime is at least as high as with heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing.
Proof:
µ¤
1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)[(1 ¡ l)r + lWAL] · WR = ˆ µ;
since due to feasibility of the bargaining process rR · WR. Q.E.D.
3.2.2 Homogeneous Multiple Bank Financing
If the only source of ﬁnancing is a continuum of small banks, the ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence
condition delivers a trigger value of ˜ µ = r + (WAL ¡ r)l, up to which she terminates
the project but proceeds for higher cash-ﬂows. The small banks’ indiﬀerence condition
yields the equilibrium value for the private signal
˜ xAL = ˜ µ +
1
p
¯
Φ¡1¡K
r
¢
:
Hence, since all banks with private information lower than ˜ xAL will foreclose, equilib-
rium value ˜ µ can be expressed as ˜ µ = r + (WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(˜ xAL ¡ ˜ µ)). Substituting for
˜ xAL then delivers
˜ µ = r ¡ K +
WALK
r
:
When comparing homogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing to the heterogeneous system
of section 3.1, we have to distinguish two diﬀerent scenarios: either the relationship
bank renegotiated the repayment rate and rolled over the loan or she foreclosed the
loan. Let us ﬁrst analyze the case of “eﬃcient coordination” of lenders, in which the
relationship bank extends the loan. It might be expected that in a heterogeneous system
the incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination is lower than in a homogeneous setting,
i.e. µ¤
1 < ˜ µ, since due to the relationship bank’s non-negligible fraction of debt a lower
amount of coordination among the individual small banks is necessary to yield the
eﬃcient outcome. We ﬁnd that this is indeed the case if:13
rR < r + (1 ¡
1
¸
)(WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
1)) ¡
K
¸
+
WALK
r¸
:
13Respectively if K > r¸
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¯(x
¤
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¤
1)) :16
If, in contrast, the relationship bank withdraws the loan, we ﬁnd that the event of inef-
ﬁcient termination of projects is lower with heterogeneous than homogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing, i.e. µ¤
2 < ˜ µ, if:14
¸ <
WALK
r ¡ K ¡ (WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
2))
WR ¡ r ¡ (WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(x¤
AL ¡ µ¤
2))
:
Lemma 6 Whenever the relationship bank causes relatively small costs for the ﬁrm,
i.e. if either the repayment rate rR or her fraction of total debt ¸ are suﬃciently small,
the incidence of ineﬃcient project liquidation is lower in a system with heterogeneous
rather than homogeneous multiple credit relations.
In order to interpret this result, consider that a low fraction of total ﬁrm debt held by
the relationship bank and a low repayment rate charged by her reduce the severity of
the hold-up problem that is at play in the heterogeneous multiple banking regime but
does not play a role an a homogeneous system.
4 Analysis of Financial Systems - Inﬁnitely Precise Infor-
mation
4.1 Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing
Apart from being able to renegotiate the repayment and providing a non-negligible
fraction of total ﬁrm debt, the relationship bank disposes of relatively more precise
private information about the ﬁrm and its project. In the extreme, we may analyze the
case in which the relationship bank’s information is completely precise, i.e. ® ! 1. It
is easy to see that the equilibrium values x¤¤
R , x¤¤
AL, µ¤¤
1 and µ¤¤
2 then converge in the
following way:
x¤¤
R ! µ¤¤
1
x¤¤
AL ! µ¤¤
1
µ¤¤
1 ! ¸rR +
1
2
(1 ¡ ¸)(WAL + r)
µ¤¤
2 ! ¸WR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(µ¤¤
1 ¡ µ¤¤
2 )) :
With completely precise information, the relationship bank will demand the maximum
feasible repayment, i.e. rR = WR, so that hold-up costs are maximized and intertem-
poral smoothing no longer exists. Since arm’s-length banks know that the relationship
bank disposes of fully precise information, their optimal strategy is to do the same as
she does. The formerly individual threshold values µ¤¤
1 , x¤¤
R and x¤¤
AL therefore converge
to one identical value. It is easy to see that threshold values µ¤¤
1 and µ¤¤
2 increase in
the relationship bank’s “size” ¸, the repayment rates r and rR and in reﬁnancing costs
WAL and WR, so that the information-eﬀect of the renegotiation process is completely
dominated by the cost-eﬀect, irrespective of the project quality.
14Respectively, if K > r¸
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4.2 Comparing Financial Industries
A completely informed relationship bank acting as monopolist is characterized by the
following equilibrium values:
ˆ ˆ µ = ˆ ˆ xR = WR :
As before, we ﬁnd that the event of ineﬃcient project liquidation is never higher with
heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing than when the relationship bank acts as monop-
olist, i.e. µ¤¤
1 · ˆ ˆ µ.
When comparing threshold values µ1
¤¤ and µ¤¤
2 from a heterogeneous system, given
that the relationship bank disposes of completely precise private information, with the
threshold level for the project’s value in a homogeneous system, we ﬁnd that µ¤¤
1 < ˜ ˜ µ
whenever15
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2
¡
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r ¡ 1
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2r
WR ¡ 1
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;
i.e. for suﬃciently low reﬁnancing costs respectively for suﬃciently low fraction of ﬁrm
debt held by the relationship bank. For µ¤¤
2 < ˜ ˜ µ it has to hold that:16
¸ <
WAL
K
r ¡ K ¡ (WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(µ¤
1 ¡ µ¤
2))
WR ¡ r ¡ (WAL ¡ r)Φ(
p
¯(µ¤
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2))
:
Since with completely precise information, the relationship bank will charge the maxi-
mum feasible repayment rate irrespective of the project value, heterogeneous multiple
bank ﬁnancing can only reduce the event of ineﬃcient project liquidation compared to
a homogeneous banking regime, if the relationship bank’s fraction of total ﬁrm debt
is suﬃciently small, so that the severity of the hold-up problem for the ﬁrm’s cost of
capital does not become too strong.
Lemma 7 Even with completely precise private information held by the relationship
bank, the incidence of ineﬃcient project liquidation in a system of heterogeneous mul-
tiple bank ﬁnancing is reduced in comparison to a monopoly situation. Compared to
a homogeneous system, however, a heterogeneous regime can only mitigate the event
of ineﬃcient project liquidation if the relationship bank’s fraction of total ﬁrm debt is
suﬃciently low.
5 Conclusion
Heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing, where ﬁrms obtain credit from both a well-
informed relationship bank and a multitude of small, less well-informed arm’s-length
15Respectively, if K > r¸
WR¡r
WAL¡r + r(1 ¡ ¸)
1
2. Note that this condition is more restrictive than the
one under ﬁnitely precise information whenever x
¤
AL > µ
¤
1 and vice versa.
16Respectively, it has to hold that K > r¸
WR¡r
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p
¯(µ
¤¤
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¤¤
2 )).18
banks, predominates in many countries. In particular small and medium-sized busi-
nesses seem to prefer such heterogeneous banking regimes over other ways to obtain
capital. Our study points to the asymmetric informational positions of the involved
banking institutions as an explaining factor for the prevalence of such heterogeneous
ﬁnancing systems.
Assuming that with increasing duration of the credit relation the relationship bank’s in-
formation about her borrowers becomes increasingly precise, we ﬁnd that heterogeneous
multiple bank ﬁnancing reduces the incidence of ineﬃcient credit termination for ﬁrms
perceived to be in ﬁnancial distress. For ﬁrms conducting sound projects, the opposite
holds. With increasing length of the credit relation, they face a higher probability of
ineﬃcient project liquidation. If we accept that small and medium-sized business typi-
cally run a higher risk of ﬁnancial distress than larger ﬁrms, we might conjecture that
particularly those smaller ﬁrms are interested in keeping up multiple credit relations
with asymmetric banking institutions.
Contrasting earlier work on the question of the optimal ﬁnancing regime (Elsas et al,
2004), we can show that even with inﬁnitely precise information by the relationship
bank, a system of heterogeneous multiple bank ﬁnancing may still reduce the incidence
of ineﬃcient termination of credit for all ﬁrms as compared to homogeneous credit
relations or a monopoly lending regime. As a suﬃcient condition, the relationship
bank’s fraction of total debt has to remain suﬃciently small as to not represent a
virtual monopoly. This result is in contrast to Elsas et al. (2004), who found that with
completely precise information held by all banks, ﬁrms with high expected cash-ﬂows
will tend to ﬁnance without a relationship bank.
Given the analysis of diﬀerent ﬁnancial systems, it might be interesting to establish the
optimal debt structure, taking into account the relationship bank’s informational advan-
tage. Obviously, the optimal ﬁnancing structure should depend mainly on the borrower
quality. As our model suggests, however, the transparency of this variable should play
an additional role. Tentatively, one might conjecture that more intransparent ﬁrms
should opt for a larger fraction of relationship lending. A detailed examination of this
question is, however, outside the scope of this paper and is left for future research.Appendix A
For rR to yield a maximum payoﬀ to the relationship bank, the second-order condition
demands that:
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where RR denotes the relationship bank’s expected payoﬀ from extending the loan.
This condition is satisﬁed, if either
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, i.e. feasibility requires
@µ¤
1
@rR to be either suﬃciently large or suﬃciently
small. Note that we do not rule out the case where the renegotiation leads the housebank
to grant a subsidy to the ﬁrm.
Appendix B
The information structure in the model is as follows. Given the realized project value
µ, private signals are distributed as xRjµ » N(µ; 1
®) and xALjµ » N(µ; 1
¯). For the
ﬁnanciers, after observing their private information, the unknown project value µ is
distributed according to µjxR » N(xR; 1
®) and µjxAL » N(xAL; 1
¯). Moreover, each
arm’s-length bank believes the relationship bank’s information to be given by xRjxAL »
N(xAL;
®+¯
®¯ ). Additionally, Cov(xR;µjxAL) = 1
¯, so that Corr(xR;µjxAL) =
1
¯ q
®+¯
®¯
q
1
¯
=
q
®
®+¯.
Derivation of the arm’s-length banks’ indiﬀerence condition and threshold x¤
AL:
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Plugging this in (10), we ﬁnd:
K
r
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p
¯(µ¤
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R µ¤
2
µ¤
1 Φ(
p
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R))'(
p
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q
®¯
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(12)
In order to solve for the optimal strategy of arm’s-length banks, it follows from equation
(4) that
µ¤
2 ¡ x¤
AL = ¡
1
p
¯
Φ¡1¡µ¤
2 ¡ ¸WR ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)r
(1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)
¢
Plugging this into (12) yields
K
r
¡
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p
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p
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q
®¯
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AL ¡ x¤
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which ﬁnally delivers equation (8).
Appendix C
From (8) it follows that the derivative of x¤
AL with respect to rR can be expressed as
@x¤
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=
1 + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)
p
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p
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p
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p
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AL))dµ
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p
¯(x¤
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´
@rR
¸
For intermediate values of K and r ! 0 or r ! 1, the second term in brackets on the
right-hand-side will converge to ¡1 respectively +1, so that overall
@x¤
AL
@rR < 0, since
@Φ¡1( K
rR
)
@rR < 0.References
[1] Allen, F. and D. Gale, 2001. Comparing Financial Systems. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
[2] Bolton, P. and D.S. Scharfstein, 1996. Optimal Debt Structure and the Number
of Creditors. The Journal of Political Economy, 104(1): 1-25.
[3] Brunner, A. and J.P. Krahnen, 2001. Multiple lenders and corporate distress:
Evidence on debt restructuring. CFS Working Paper No. 2001/04, Frankfurt.
[4] Carletti, E. 2004. The Structure of Bank Relationships, Endogenous Monitoring
and Loan Rates. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13: 58-86.
[5] Carlsson, H. and E. Van Damme, 1993. Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
in Coordination Games. Econometrica 61: 989–1018.
[6] D’Auria, C., A. Foglia and P. Marullo-Reedtz, 1999. Bank interest rates and credit
relationships in Italy. Journal of Banking & Finance. 23(7): 1067-1093.
[7] Detragiache, E., P. Garella and L. Guiso, 2000. Multiple versus Single Banking
Relationships: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 55, pp. 1133–1161.
[8] Dewatripont, M. and E. Maskin, 1995. Credit and eﬃciency in centralized and
decentralized economies. Review of Economic Studies. 62: 541-555.
[9] Elsas, R. and J.P. Krahnen, 1998. Is relationship lending special? Evidence from
credit-ﬁle data in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance. 22(10-11): 1283-1316.
[10] Elsas, R., F. Heinemann and M. Tyrell, 2004. Multiple but Asymmetric Bank
Financing: The Case of Relationship Lending. Mimeo.
[11] Foglia, A., S. Laviola and P. Marullo-Reedtz, 1998. Multiple banking relationships
and the fragility of corporate borrowers. Journal of Banking & Finance. 22(10-11):
1441-1456.
[12] Hubert, F. and D. Sch¨ afer, 2002. Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lend-
ing, the Cost of Protection Agains a Powerful Lender. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics. 158(2)
[13] Machauer, A. and M. Weber, 2001. Number of Bank Relationships: An Indica-
tor of Competition, Borrower Quality, or just Size? Working Paper No. 01-04.
University of Mannheim.
[14] Morris, S., Shin, H.S., 2002. Global Games: Theory and Applications. In: De-
watripont, M., Hansen, L., Turnovsky, S. (Eds.), Advances in Economics and
Econometrics, the Eighth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.[15] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin, 2004. Coordination risk and the price of debt, European
Economic Review 48, 133-153.
[16] Ongena, S. and D. Smith, 2000. What Determines the Number of Bank Rela-
tionships? Cross-Country Evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, pp.
26–56.
[17] Pagratis, S. 2004. Co-ordination Failure and the Role of Banks in the Resolution
of Financial Distress. Mimeo, London School of Economics.
[18] Rajan, R., 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s-
length debt. Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1367–1400.
[19] The Economist, 2003. Without credit - Financing Germany’s Mittelstand. Novem-
ber 1-7 2003. 
 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting 
 
No.148:  Christina E. Bannier, Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing, Optimal 
Business Risk an Information Disclosure, March 2005 
No.147:  Andreas Hackethal/ Reinhard H. Schmidt, Structural Change in the German 
Banking System?, January 2005 
No.146:  Andreas Hackethal/ Reinhard H. Schmidt/ Marcel Tyrell, Banks and 
German Corporate Governance: On the Way to a Capital Market-Based 
System?, February 2005 
No.145:  Jan Muntermann/ André Güttler, Intraday stock price effects of ad hoc 
disclosures: The German Case, February 2005 
No.144:  Ekaterina Losovskaja, Die Altersvorsorge in Russland – Theoretische Analyse, 
aktuelle Rahmenbedingungen und ihre Umsetzung, Januar 2005 
No.143:  Till Mahr/ Eric Nowak/ Roland Rott,  Wer den Kodex nicht einhält, den 
bestraft der Kapitalmarkt?, November 2004 
No.142:  Reinhard H. Schmidt/ Marcel Tyrell, Information Theory and the Role of 
Intermediaries in Corporate Governance, October 2004 
No.141:  Ralf Elsas/ Frank Heinemann/ Marcel Tyrell, Multiple but Asymmetric Bank 
Financing: The Case of Relationship Lending, September 2004 
No.140:  Nicole Branger/ Christian Schlag, Can Tests Based on Option Hedging Errors 
Correctly Identify Volatility Risk Premia?, November 2004 
No.139:  Ralf Elsas, Preemptive Distress Resolution through Bank Mergers, September 
2004 
No.138:  Nicole Branger/ Christian Schlag, Is Jump Risk Priced? – What We Can (and 
Cannot) Learn From Option Hedging Errors, September 2004 
No.137:  Nicole Branger/ Antje Mahayniv, Tractable Hedging – An Implementation of 
Robust Hedging Strategies, November 2004 
No.136:  Angelika Esser/ Burkart Mönch, Modeling Feedback Effects with Stochastic 
Liquidity, November 2004 
No.135:  Nicole Branger/ Angelika Esser/ Christian Schlag,  When are Static 
Superhedging Strategies Optimal?, September 2004 
No.134:  Günther Gebhardt/ Holger Daske, Zukunftsorientierte Bestimmung von 
Kapitalkosten für die Unternehmensbewertung, September 2004 
No.133:  Christian Laux/ Volker Laux, Performance Measurement and Information 
Production, September 2004 
No.132:  André Güttler, Using a Bootstrap Approach to Rate the Raters, October 2004 
 
 
For a complete list of  working papers please visit 
www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
Contact information for orders: 
 
Professor Dr. Reinhard H. Schmidt 
Wilhelm Merton Professur für  
Internationales Bank- und Finanzwesen 
Mertonstr. 17 
Postfach 11 19 32 / HPF66 
D-60054 Frankfurt/Main 
 
Tel.: +49-69-798-28269 
Fax: +49-69-798-28272 
e-mail: merton@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de 
http://www.finance.uni-frankfurt.de 
With kind support from  
Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe Hessen-Thüringen. 